Frontpage Interview�s guest is Paul (Dave) Gaubatz, a former U.S. Federal Agent (Arabic linguist/counter-terrorist specialist) who was deployed to Iraq at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. His mission was to search for WMDs. Four sites he identified were not searched by ISG (Iraq Survey Group) and he has waged a three year battle to get them searched. He is currently the Chief Investigator with the Dallas County Medical Examiner, Dallas, TX. He can be contacted at pdgaubatz@yahoo.com.
FP: Let�s start with your background. Tell us a bit about who you are and why you were sent to Iraq at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Gaubatz: I served 20 years on active duty with the USAF and had spent 12 of those years as an OSI Special Agent (counter-terrorism/counter-intelligence. After retiring I obtained a position as a civilian Federal Agent with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI).
Directly after Sept 11th, I was sent to the U.S. State Department (Foreign Service Institute) for a one year intensive Arabic language course. Immediately afterwards I was deployed (as a civilian Agent) to Saudi Arabia from Jan 2003 until Mar 2003. I was the only civilian in the area.
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, I was assigned to an area along the Saudi and Iraq border (Arar Air Base, Saudi Arabia). My mission directly before the war was to develop intelligence to eliminate espionage by Saudi Arabian military officials who we suspected of passing U.S. war fighting intelligence to Iraqi intelligence officers. I conducted an operation against one Saudi military officer and his activities were deterred and he is no longer a U.S. threat. I also conducted missions along the border of Iraq before the war to collect intelligence on Iraqi movement and their war fighting capabilities.
The 5 man team I was assigned to collected intelligence on the probability of chemical or biological weapons being used against our forces by the Iraqis. Initially Saudi officers advised Saddam Hussein would not use WMD during the war, but as the days got closer the Saudi officers were wearing chemical protective equipment as we were. You could see the look of defeat in the Saudis� eyes. All along they had been saying Saddam would not use WMD, but in their heart they knew he had the capability and would do so if he had the opportunity.
In April 2003, I was deployed into Nasiriyah, Iraq. Again I was the first and only civilian Federal Agent there. My primary mission in Iraq was to locate suspected WMD sites and conduct Force Protection Operations (find out the threats against U.S. forces in the area). I was to also locate Iraqis who were loyal to Saddam Hussein.
FP: Tell us about the sites you identified and why the ISG never searched them.
Gaubatz: There are four sites I identified in southern Iraq. Two are within the city limits, one about 20 miles south of Nasiriyah (in the vicinity of Suk Ash Shuyakh), and another near the port of Umm Qasr (near Basrah). Three agents and I identified these sites. We had multiple sources, from various backgrounds, and who had access to the information.
One must remember that at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the average Iraqi was more open to providing Americans intelligence. They wanted Saddam removed and wanted chemical and biological weapons removed as well. The people of southern Iraq had fully expected WMDs to be used against them as well. Each of their homes had been prepared for a chemical attack. Many had gas masks and had sealed certain rooms in their homes. We were shown this.
Iraqis from backgrounds such as Iraqi Police officers, Doctors, Engineers, Iraqi Govt. officials, farmers, tribesmen, etc. identified sites that contained WMDs. They explained in detail why WMDs were in these areas and asked the U.S. to remove the WMDs. Much of the WMDs had been buried in rivers (within concrete bunkers), and in the sewage pipe system. There were signs of chemical activity in the area (missile imprints, gas masks, decontamination kits, atropine needles, etc..) The Iraqis and my team had no doubt WMDs were hidden in these areas.
The Agents and I knew we had found what we had been looking for. We immediately wrote our reports, which included all the source names, their credibility, their contact information, grid coordinates of the sites, and photographs. The reports were then sent to the U.S. Weapons Inspectors (in northern Iraq). This was mid April 2003. We were initially told by the Inspectors that their team was not organized at this point to conduct exploitations of sites. The sites we had identified would require an extensive amount of excavation. The actual ISG was not formed until a couple of months after the war. Not only did ISG not have the people and proper equipment, they advised Iraq was still a combat zone and very dangerous. ISG members further told us that WMD searches were being concentrated in northern Iraq, and not southern Iraq.
This was the first and largest mistake by ISG. During my intelligence gathering the Iraqis had told us that Saddam concentrated on hiding the WMDs in the southern region because the history of prior UN Weapons Inspections had always concentrated in searches of northern faculties. Searches in southern Iraq had primarily been helicopter flyovers. I have respect for every U.S. member of ISG who served in Iraq, but as an organization, the management was poor. They were not organized nor prepared for this type operation. I compare them to FEMA during Hurricane Katrina. Good people, but poor management. Poor management results in disaster and failure.
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